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Abstract
This paper is a quantitative exercise in the economic analysis of optimal fiscal policy. 
We look at an incomplete market economy where agents face idiosyncratic labor produc-
tivity shocks and borrowing constraints. We find the steady state equilibrium of this econ-
omy and then analyze the effect of a government policy introducing a capital income tax 
and redistributing the proceeds of tax collection back to the agents in the form of a labor 
subsidy. We find that this type of policy can indeed improve the welfare of the economy, 
but its quantitative effect is small. We thus conclude that using capital income tax as fiscal 
policy instrument is not an effective way to cure the problem of market incompleteness.
Keywords: optimal fiscal policy, incomplete markets, precautionary saving
1 Introduction
Optimal taxation is an area in economics that always produces heated debates. The 
standard theory calls for smooth labor taxes and zero capital income tax,1 a rather un-
popular result from the perspective of political economy. Recent advances in this strand 
of literature have been made in incomplete market, heterogeneous agents models where 
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1 See Chamley (1986) for this result.68
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Aiyagari (1995) showed that the optimal capital income tax rate is strictly positive. The 
reason for this result is that in an incomplete market economy where agents face unin-
surable idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks and borrowing constraints, they tend to 
overaccumulate assets in the form of precautionary savings - as a means to buffer labor 
income volatility and smooth consumption, - agents amass capital stock and try to self-
insure.
In this paper, we wanted to extend this result to an environment in which agents not 
only care about their consumption profile, but also about their leisure time, and then see 
whether this welfare-improving result still hold. Including leisure in the utility function 
reduces the welfare impact of a bad productivity shock as agents not working are able to 
enjoy more leisure time. Therefore, the resulting need for the accumulation of capital as 
a self-insurance device is lower than in an economy without a labor-leisure decision and 
the tax effect could be less pronounced or could even vanish. In addition, in our model 
we let the government redistribute the collected taxes and use them to grant labor subsi-
dies, rewarding the effort of the workers and increasing incentives to work. We find that 
with our parameterization welfare still improves, but as expected, by a smaller margin 
than that found in Braun and Uhlig (2000).
In modeling the economy, we follow the approach by Braun and Uhlig and consider 
only steady state equilibria, ignoring the transition effects of changing the tax rate, which 
could very well be welfare-offsetting.2 In section 2 we describe the model economy: the 
agents, their preferences, production sector and financial markets, and present the indi-
vidual decision problem and the steady state equilibrium. Section 3 explains the calibra-
tion of the model and the computational procedure needed to reach the equilibrium, while 
section 4 presents the results. First we give an exhaustive description of the benchmark 
economy and then present a comparative study for different capital income tax rates.  The 
last section provides conclusions.
2 The model economy
Time is discrete, t = 1,2,... and the economy is the standard growth economy with 
production. We compare only steady states. The first three subsections describe our 
model economy: consumers and their preferences, producers and their technology, and 
the characteristics of the financial market. In subsection 2.4 we state the individual de-
cision problem, the next subsection presents the formal definition of the steady state 
equilibrium, while the last subsection explains the mechanics of capital income tax in-
troduction. 
2.1 Consumers
The economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived agents with names in the unit 
interval, i  [0,1]. All agents have identical preferences, defined over individual consump-
tion ct and leisure lt and given by the following total utility function:
2 To learn more about transition problematics, one should look at Garcia et al. (1995).69
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3 These technical assumptions incorporate our standard economic beliefs about the characteristics of individual 
utility functions (more is better, but at a diminishing rate...), guarantee a unique and an interior solution to the maxi-
mization problem and facilitate its computation and analysis.
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where ß ∈ 0,1 ()  is the discount factor reflecting agents’ impatience towards the future,
u ⋅ () : R+
2 → R  is the period utility function and E is the expectation operator. We assume 
a utility function that satisfies all the standard properties, i.e., one that is time separable, 
homothetic, continuous, differentiable, bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave and 
that satisfies the Inada conditions.3
All agents are ex ante identical. However, in each time period they receive an idio-
syncratic random labor productivity shock ψ∈Ψ, that makes them heterogeneous ex post. 
The labor productivity shock evolves according to the first order finite-state Markov proc-
ess which is assumed to be identical and independent across agents. The probability that, 
given the state of today’s of productivity shock ψ, tomorrow’s shock will be ψ΄  is given 
by a transition function  (ψ′ |ψ) which satisfies ∑Ψ′   (ψ′ |ψ)=1 ∀ψ ψ ∈Ψ  and  (ψ′ |ψ)>0 
∀ψ,ψ′∈Ψ. We also assume that idiosyncratic shocks cancel out so that there is no uncer-
tainty on the level of the aggregate labor endowment. 
2.2 Firms
There is a competitive sector of profit-maximizing firms hiring labor Ht and renting 
capital Kt to produce output with the following neoclassical production function:
  Yt = F(Kt,Ht).  (2)
The production technology is assumed to satisfy constant returns to scale, continuity, 
differentiability, strict monotonicity and convexity assumptions. In addition, we also im-
pose the Inada and no-free-lunch conditions.
Firms face a static, period by period problem and solve the following maximization 
problem:
  max
Kt ,Ht
F(Kt,Ht)−rtKt −wtHt, (3)
where rt is the return on capital and wt is the wage rate, both in terms of period t con-
sumption. Since the sector is competitive and thus profits are zero, in the equilibrium the 
prices of capital and labor will be given by their marginal return:
 
rt =
∂F(Kt,Ht)
∂Kt
,  (4)
 
wt =
∂F(Kt,Ht)
∂Ht
.  (5)70
D. Medak Fell: Can Capital Income Tax Improve Welfare in an Incomplete Market Economy with
a Labor-Leisure Decision?
Financial Theory and Practice 30 (1), 67-76 (2006)
Capital depreciates at an exogenously given rate δ ∈ 0,1 [] . Aggregate capital Kt re-
sults from the aggregation of all assets across agents, while aggregate labor Ht is the ag-
gregate across individual labor supply. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, prices in 
the steady state will remain constant and from now on we suppress the time index.
2.3 Market arrangements
Financial markets in this economy have two types of imperfection. One is that agents 
are not allowed to hold negative assets, i.e., they face a tight borrowing constraint b ≥0 . 
The second feature is the absence of insurance markets in which agents would be able to 
insure against their idiosyncratic shock ψ.4 As a result, the only way to smooth their con-
sumption given their volatile income stream is through self-insurance: they will save in 
the only available asset – the physical capital. 
2.4 Individual decision problem
In the beginning, at period t = 0, all agents are endowed with an initial amount of cap-
ital ki, 0. They derive their period t income from working hi,t ∈ 0,1 []  normalized hours 
(for which they receive w) , and from renting their capital stock to the firms (for which 
they receive R = 1 + r – δ). In any given period they can receive a beneficial labor pro-
ductivity shock and be fully productive, i.e., ψ = 1, or they can end up with a bad shock 
and be completely unproductive, ψ = 0. Then, they use their period t income to buy con-
sumption goods or to amass new capital stock, where negative investment is also permit-
ted (the agents can resell their capital holdings in order to buy consumption).5
Now, the agents’ problem is choosing the optimal sequences of consumption, leisure 
and capital savings  ct,lt,kt+1 {} t=0
∞ , that maximize their expected present discounted life-
time utility given their budget constraint, no negativity constraint on consumption, bor-
rowing constraint on capital and feasibility constraint on the labor-leisure choice.6 Tech-
nically, we write this problem as a sequential dynamic program (SP):
 
max
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  s.t. ct + kt+1 ≤ whtψt + Rkt,  (7)
  ct ≥0,kt+1 ≥ b,  (8)
  lt +ht =1.  (9)
4 In this paper we simply impose the absence of insurance markets on agents, even though this market structure 
can be explicitly accounted for using market imperfections such as moral hazard, adverse selection or limited enfor-
ceability problems which limit perfect risk sharing among agents. For recent references concerning the  endogenous 
incomplete markets theory see Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
5 Note that this only implies that investment is reversible and capital can be sold and exchanged for consumpti-
on in any period. However, this does not imply agent can have negative assets, i.e., accumulate debt.
6 We suppress the individual subscript since all agents are ex ante identical and will follow the same optimal 
decision rule.71
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Given our assumptions on the utility function, from the Contraction Mapping The-
orem as explained in Stokey et al. (1989) we know that this problem can be rewritten in 
the recursive form of the Bellman equation whose solution is the same as the solution to 
our original SP problem, and has the additional advantage that it is computationally easi-
er to reach. We call this problem the functional equation program (FE):
 
v(k,ψ)= max
c,l, ′ k
u(c,l )+βEv( ′ k, ′ ψ ) { }
s.t. c+ ′ k ≤ whψ+Rk,
c ≥0, ′ k ≥ b,
l +h =1,   (10)
where v (k, ψ) denotes the value function given today’s capital and productivity shock. 
The solution to the FE program consists of the optimal policy functions for consumption 
today c = c (k, ψ), the work-leisure decision today l = l (k, ψ) and the capital to save for 
tomorrow k' = (k, ψ), all given state variables {k, ψ}.
2.5 Equilibrium
The steady state recursive equilibrium for this economy is the value function v (k, ψ), 
the set of optimal policy functions {c, l, k} and the distribution of households such that:
•   given factor prices {w, R}, the policy functions {c, l, k} solve the consumers’ deci-
sion problem described in the last section,
•   given factor prices {w, R}, firms maximize their profits,
•   all markets clear – after aggregation across individual variables, given the steady 
state distribution of agents, the feasibility constraint must hold:
  K =
0
1 ∫ kdi,   (11)
  H =
0
1 ∫ hdi,   (12)
  C + ′ K = F(K,H)+(1−δ)K,  (13)
•   the distribution of households across assets is stationary.
From Huggett (1993) we also know that this equilibrium is characterized by β R <1, 
i.e., the market interest rate is lower then the subjective preference rate.
2.6 Introduction of taxes
After finding the equilibrium of this incomplete markets economy with heterogeneous 
agents and borrowing constraints, we assess the effect of introducing capital income taxa-
tion which is then redistributed in the form of a labor subsidy proportional to the hours of 
work. To do this, we let τh = ετk  K
H  be the total amount of capital income tax that is redis-72
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tributed to labor, where ε ∈ 0,1 [ )  denotes the efficiency loss by having the government 
transfer taxes from capital to labor. With these assumptions, labor income is now given by 
(w +τ h) hψ, and this is the expression we now plug into the above budget constraint. 
3 Calibration and computation
We choose to work with the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class of utility 
functions of the form
E0
t=1
∞
∑β
t
ηct
−γ +(1−η)lt
−γ ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦
−1/γ {}
1−σ
−1
1−σ
where ß, η, γ and σ are preference parameters. We set the time discount factor ß = 0,99, the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion σ = 1,001, the weight consumers place on consumption 
η = 0,33 and the adjustment factor γ = 0,0001. These are all standard values used in related 
literature, based on microeconomic and macroeconomic observations and consistent with 
stylized facts observed in the data. Technology is Cobb-Douglas  F(Kt,Ht) =TKt
αHt
1−α , 
where T = 0,5 is a scale parameter and α = 0,36 stands for the capital income share in 
the GDP. We assume the time period to be the quarter of a year, and therefore set the de-
preciation rate of capital at δ = 0,025. The set of labor productivity shocks is Ψ = {0,1} 
and we set both shocks to be equally likely,   (ψ′ |ψ) = 0,5. The borrowing limit b is 
fixed at 1 unit. 
The computing procedure used to find the equilibrium consists of three steps:
1    Guess the equilibrium capital-labor ratio, or equivalently the equilibrium prices 
{r, w} such that ßR<1. As a good initial guess, we can use either the results from 
related models already investigated in the literature, or we can start somewhere 
close to the complete market result (which can be found analytically) and work 
from there.
2    Given this guess, compute the optimal decision rules over a capital grid for each 
of the two possible labor productivity shocks.
3    Simulate the shocks and the resulting behavior of the model economy for a long 
time period and check if the resulting capital-labor ratio is the same as the guess. If 
it is, the equilibrium has been found. If not, update the guess using simple economic 
intuition7 and repeat the procedure until approximate market clearing is obtained.
We designed the grid for capital to consist of 1500 points, where the initial points 
are closer together and the grid is finer to control for the accuracy of the approximated 
policy rules. Between grid points we used linear approximation so that the algorithm ap-
proximates the policy functions, given the initial guess for the equilibrium prices {r, w}, 
7 If the initial guess created excess demand, it should be increased, while if it resulted in excess supply, it sho-
uld be decreased.73
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by piecewise linear functions. The accuracy criterion we used for the iteration on policy 
functions is 10e-5, while market clearing was achieved with the precision of 0,0005 units 
of zero. We simulate the time series for 300 thousand periods in order to insure ergodic-
ity. Additionally, we kept constant the random number generator seed to achieve consist-
ent results for all tested models.
When we introduce capital income tax τk and labor subsidy τh, we test for τk =  {0,01; 
0,05; 0,10} and compare the results with the benchmark model without taxes.8 We also 
assume a very efficient government that succeeds in redistributing ε = 99% of its capi-
tal income taxes.
The Matlab file containing the algorithm for this computational procedure is avail-
able upon request. 
4 Results
First we deal with optimal decision rules for consumption, capital savings and leisure 
as shown in Figure 1. Notice that all policy rules behave in the same way as described in 
Huggett (1993), i.e., they inherit the monotonicity and convexity properties of the return 
function, and the optimal level of tomorrow’s consumption, leisure time or saving, given 
the capital level today, is always higher when the agent experiences a positive productiv-
ity shock than when he experiences a negative one. The only exception is the policy rule 
for leisure: note that the agent will always choose not to work if he is hit with a bad pro-
ductivity shock, as this is the corner solution to his maximization problem.9
Next, notice that when we compare the optimal levels for a good and a bad shock the 
difference is bigger for low levels of capital, while it almost disappears for high levels of 
capital. This is especially pronounced in the consumption policy rule. This result suggests 
that poor agents are more vulnerable to bad shocks as they do not hold sufficient asset hold-
ings to buffer themselves against a temporary low productivity level, but instead they are 
forced to hold back on their consumption patterns. Further analysis reveals that all agents 
optimally decide to save a large fraction of their current capital for the future (the optimal 
policy rule is close to the 45˚line), not distinguishing very much between the good and 
the bad shock case. This result follows directly from our assumptions on the distribution 
of shocks: the risk of becoming poor is very high, so all agents try very hard to avoid this 
state and amass capital as quickly as they can.
Next, we report the equilibrium objects for the benchmark model economy and the 
economies in which we introduced capital income taxation. Table 1 shows the equilib-
rium prices, the capital-labor ratio and average welfare. Notice that the introduction of 
the tax rate pushes the equilibrium level of capital-labor ratio towards its complete mar-
ket level of 12,8618, and the interest rate respectively towards 3,51%. This means that 
the increase in the capital income tax effectively acts to reduce agents’ asset holdings (as 
8 The reason we don’t test for higher levels of tax rates is that they pushed the interest rate towards its com-
plete market level, and for the given level of unemployment uncertainty, we encountered numerical problems in our 
algorithm.
9 This is the reason why Figure 1 shows only the interesting case of the good productivity shock.74
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capital income yields less after-tax income) and shifts agents’ interest toward more work 
effort and to increasing the share of labor income (as this is not taxed). With smaller sav-
ings, capital becomes scarcer and the interest on it goes up, while labor supply is more 
abundant and the equilibrium wage rate decreases. The last rows of Table 1 confirms the 
hypothesis of this paper: the increase of the capital income tax rate leads to higher aver-
age (individual) welfare,10 and a closer look at Table 2 reveals that this increase is quanti-
tatively very modest. The interpretation is as follows: because agents do not need to save 
a lot of excess capital to safeguard against bad shocks, they enjoy higher consumption in 
the equilibrium of our model economy, which increases their welfare. However, they com-
pensate for lower capital levels by working longer hours, sacrificing their leisure time and 
thus reducing welfare. The overall effect on welfare is still positive, but low. For exam-
ple, the highest capital income tax of 10% manages to reduce the precautionary savings 
level to just 1%, but the resulting increase in welfare is just 0,59%.
Figure 1 Optimal policy rules and the equilibrium distribution of capital
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10 Note that the negative value for welfare is just a question of mathematical normalization.75
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Therefore, we can conclude that even though analytically it seemed there was room 
for government intervention in the light of market imperfections, quantitatively this result 
is much less convincing. As expected, it is much more advisable to try to correct market 
failures by addressing the issue directly at the root of the problem (in our case, uninsur-
able productivity risk and borrowing constraints), and not by introducing a different type 
of market distortion that inhibits the free functioning of the market (capital income tax). 
Additionally, remember that in our model economy we assumed a very high degree of 
government efficiency in redistributing taxes, which is an assumption somewhat at odds 
with the situation in the real world.
Table 1 Equilibrium objects
Benchmark Tax rate  Tax rate  Tax rate 
economy 1% 5% 10%
Interest rate 0.034759 0.034853 0.034867 0.034879
Wage rate 0.8070 0.8058 0.8056 0.8054
Capital-labor ratio 13.0602 13.0079 13.0022 12.9908
Mean welfare - 0.7166 - 0.7164 - 0.7152 - 0.7124
Source: author's calculation
Table 2 Percentage changes
Benchmark Tax rate  Tax rate  Tax rate 
economy 1% 5% 10%
Precautionary savings 1.54 1.12 1.05 1.00
in mean welfare – 0.03 0.20 0.59
Source: author's calculation
5 Conclusion
In this paper we tested the validity of an analytical result on optimal fiscal policy and 
investigated its quantitative implications. We looked at an incomplete market economy 
where agents face idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks and borrowing constraints and 
then analyzed the effects of introducing a fiscal policy that taxes capital income and re-
distributes the collected taxes back to the agents in the form of a labor subsidy. We found 
that in our model economy this fiscal policy is desirable and that it indeed improves the 
welfare of the economy. However, this improvement is of such a small extent as largely 
to weaken any arguments in favor of implementing this type of policy.
A possible extension of this paper is a sensitivity analysis where the results are tested 
for their robustness to the changes in parameters’ values. Given that we used a very stand-
ard parameterization (adjusted to mimic the American stylized facts of growth), this ex-76
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ercise in itself would not be scientifically rewarding. However, if we are able to convinc-
ingly argue or show that there are reasons to believe the parameters to be of significantly 
different values, the case for sensitivity analysis is stronger. This is why our proposal for 
further research is to calibrate the model to fit Croatian data. If anything, this effort would 
provide a first attempt to quantify the calibration parameters for the Croatian economy that 
could subsequently be used in any general equilibrium model designed to address Croatian 
economic issues. Additionally, we could also check whether the quantitative implications 
of the present model change significantly and use this finding for a possible fiscal policy 
recommendation. However, due to the lack of a longer time series and other data, this rep-
resents a project that is sufficiently challenging as to require further research.
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